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Trust and Detection:





Standard agency relationships are structured around divergent interests on
the side of the Principal and of the Agent. When a Principal does not trust
an Agent there are strong incentives for the former to impose bounds on the
Agent's actions or to discover the actual type of those with whom interact-
ing. Prendergast (1999) notices, with reference to the standard approach
of economics to agency problems, that "incentives are provided to workers
through the compensation practices of rms, encompassing monitoring, eval-
uation, and contracting and rms use many dierent mechanisms to align
interests". However, recent experimental contributions have highlighted the
importance of incentive structures which are not considered by the stan-
dard framework of selsh rational approach (Fehr et al., 1998). Aim of the
present contribution is to investigate, through an experimental analysis, the
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relationship between trust, intrinsic motivations and autonomy supportive
behavior in a hierarchical two-party relationship. The main hypothesis lead-
ing experimental work is that tasks which are freely managed by Agents (i.e.,
not under the control of the Principal), are more likely to foster intrinsic
motivations and that environments where intrinsic motivations prevail will
favor cooperative behavior.
The paper focuses on choices signaling trust and trustworthiness. Trust,
as a re
ection of social capital, is a constitutive element of economic trans-
actions (Arrow, 1974). A considerable amount of economic contributions
has focused on the impact of social capital on economic growth (Porta et al.,
1997). Many dierent conceptualizations of trust have been proposed (Hardin,
2001) but the dominant denition in the economic literature is still the
one based on rational maximization (i.e., trust as calculativeness). As
Williamson (1993) notices in a well-known work, calculative trust is not
formally distinguishable from the standard economic paradigm of utility
maximization under risk. Unfortunately, a trust process based on strict
risk-benet analysis has to be considered, quoting Williamson, as "a contra-
diction in terms"[p. 463]. Other works have rejected the strict consequen-
tialist characterization of trust provided by mainstream economics and have
preferred to switch to content-specic trust lead by social heuristics. Ac-
cording to this kind of conceptualization, trust is an "appropriate" (March,
1994) behavior matching characteristics of the subject and the environment.
Some of these contributions (see among others, Messik and Kramer, 2003;
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Yamaghishi, 2001) have evidenced the role of the reference group and iden-
tication with this in dening trust and trustworthy behavior. In recent
times, experimental evidence showing that a standard denition of calcula-
tiveness trust cannot explain the behavior of subjects in very simple games
(Berg et al., 1995; Cox, 2004) has been collected. Cultural and social factors
have been considered in explaining trust and reciprocity behavior in exper-
imental settings (Glaeser et al., 2000; Buchan and Croson, 2004). Other
experimental contributions have found that trust is more in
uenced by in-
nate characteristics of the subjects (G achter et al., 2004) and that articial
manipulation of the relationship between the subjects does not provide sig-
nicant results in rewarded laboratory experiments (G uth et al., 2004). For
what attains trust in laboratory settings which try to replicate workplace
environments, it is interesting to refer to the work of Fehr et al. (1998). The
experiments conducted show that higher oers in terms of retribution are
honored by workers even if the contract to which they adhere is incomplete
and the Principal cannot enforce the agreement. The present study ana-
lyzes the interaction between intrinsic motivations and social preferences in
the form of trust and reciprocity. Intrinsic motivations have been dened
as those motivations associated with doing something "because it is inher-
ently interesting or enjoyable"(Ryan and Deci, 2000). As shown by previous
contributions autonomy in decision making is the key element for intrinsic
motivations to prevail. In this perspective a control strategy introduced by
the Principal to bound the actions of the Agent is likely to be perceived as a
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signal of distrust (on this aspect see, among others, Deci et al., 1989). For
what attains real-life observations, perceived distrust in the workplace has
been shown to destroy cooperation and intrinsic motivations of the employ-
ees (Kramer, 1999).
In previous studies a lot of attention has been paid to individual and
environmental characteristics as determinants of trust and reciprocity. At
the same time, the propensity of economics to consider preferences as given
primitives has led to the neglection of processes characterizing preference
formation. The present work aims at considering, with a certain degree of
novelty, the interaction between trust preferences and intrinsic motivations
of the subjects. Particular attention will be reserved for the impact of a
control strategy on reciprocity and intrinsic motivations when confronted
with an alternative autonomy-supportive strategy. The experimental de-
sign which will be presented in section 2 has been conceived to account,
within a simple and manageable structure, for choices of the Agent char-
acterized alternatively by intrinsic or extrinsic motivations in association
with autonomy-bounding or autonomy-supportive actions performed by the
Principal.
2 Experimental Design
The main consideration when designing the experiment was the possibility
of testing alternative behavior structures within a simple and manageable
framework providing a benchmark for rational behavior. The hierarchical
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structure embedded in the standard Investment Game naturally recalls the
relationship between a Principal and an Agent in an agency framework.
The game was played with integer numbers and this has allowed to keep the
computational side of the task easy enough to be aorded even without the
support of an electronic calculator.
2.1 The Intention Detection Game
To introduce the game it is useful to present a real-life situation which re-

ects the basic strategic tension of the experimental game. An employer
(Principal) has to decide whether to invest on the training of an employee
(Agent) or not. The decision is risky for the employer because there are
no options to bound the employee's action after the training has been com-
pleted. The employee has thus the incentive to exploit the opportunity to
be trained by the current employer and then be hired by another rm at a
salary which accounts for the increase in productivity following the training
but not for its cost. The current employer opens a vulnerability for herself
by "sponsoring" the training of the employee. However, before entering this
risky investment the employer is oered the opportunity of knowing the in-
tentions of the employee, who is made aware of this option and of the choice
of the Principal. The game, as depicted in Figure 1, is a very simple set-
ting for strategic interaction between two Players, henceforth named Player
I (Principal) and Player II (Agent). The game is a sequential game with
complete and perfect information presented in an extensive form. It is also
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important to notice here that, ex post, there is no dierence between a con-
trol on intentions or a control on actions as long as preferences are invariant
with respect to the introduction of the monitoring system. However, from
a more behavioral perspective and with the support of research in social
psychology it is interesting to test for the eect of the introduction of the
monitoring system.
Figure 1: The intention detection game
The rst decisional node belongs to Player I who can decide whether
to buy (D = 1) or not to buy (D = 0) a detection technology and pay
accordingly to the choice undertaken a cost of c. In other words, the rst
mover can decide whether to enter a standard Investment Game or play a
modied Investment Game with intention detection. To nd the rational
selsh equilibrium of the whole game, equilibrium in both subgames (IG
with detection and without detection) will be separately considered.
When Player I chooses not to buy the technology both Players enter a
standard Investment Game (IG). The IG is structured in the following way:
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Player I, whom in the game is called Trustor, has an endowment E and
decides how much to send to Player II, who is called Trustee. The condition
0  a  E on the amount sent a must be fullled. The amount a is then
multiplied by an exogenously given factor m and assigned to Player II. Player
II and Player I are initially endowed with the same amount of wealth. The
wealth of Player II after Player I's action amounts to e+ma. In the second
stage of the game Player II chooses how much to submit to Player I. The
amount sent, b, must satisfy the condition 0  b  ma. Finally, payos are
computed and subjects are accordingly retributed.
Given the structure of the game, the value of the payo for Player I,
assuming for convenience linearity of the value function with respect to the
payos, will thus be equal to
vI = E   a + b
while the value for Player II will be equal to
v2 = E + ma   b
Applying backward induction it is easy to show that the pure strategy
subgame perfect equilibrium in the IG is for Player II to return an amount
equal to 0 and thus for Player I to invest an amount equal to 0. Given these
strategies, the resulting equilibrium outcomes in the investment subgame
will be vI(s
I) = E and vII(s
II) = E.
When Player I decides for detection the two actors interact over a struc-
ture which is the one of the Investment Game but the "meaning" of their
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actions is altered by the detection "technology". Indeed, when the detec-
tion strategy is purchased at cost c intentions on actions of Player II are
perfectly visible to Player I and Player II is made aware of this. The word
intention here means anticipated actions. Before being revealed by the detec-
tion strategy intentions are private information on the reciprocation nature
of the partner. Player II knows that the detection technology is at work but
does not know whatthe investment preferences of the Principal are. The
detection of intentions is implemented in the following way: when the Prin-
cipal buys the detection technology the Agent has to state for each possible
action a of the Principal, where (0 < a 6 (e   c)), the intention to reward
the investment made by the Principal. The collection of the complete strat-
egy of the Agent is obtained through a strategy method: the output of the
intention's scan is registered into a vector where each element of the vector
corresponds to the reward in correspondence to each possible amount sub-
mitted by Player I. Given the parameters employed in the experiment the
vector will have the following structure fbj1;bj2;bj3;bj4;bj5;bj6;bj7;bj8;bj9g,
where the conditional term is the amount a submitted by Player I. After
receiving information about intentions to reward the investment, Player I
has to choose how much actually she wants to submit to Player II. The Prin-
cipal's decision, a, must satisfy the condition [0 6 a 6 e   c]. The actual
investment decision is then matched with the corresponding element of the
repayment vector. The payos of the Agent and the Principal are thus given
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by the following equations:
v1 = E   c   a + bja
v2 = E + ma   bja
To nd the equilibrium outcome in the modied Investment Game with
intention detection it is useful to start from the consideration that Player
II, the Agent, can direct the strategy of Player I by appropriately chosing
a strategy vector. The payo structure implies that the gains of Player II
increase in a linear way according to the factor m in Player's I investment
while decrease by factor 1 with respect to the conditional payment, or eort,
allocated in the game. As long as m > 1 the dominating action for Player II
is to oer the minimum payment, or eort, that will suce to induce Player
I to invest her entire endowment at that stage (a = E c). In order to induce
the desired action the actual best solution in the game for Player II is thus to
choose a conditional repayment vector equal to fE c+j9;bj8;:::;bj1g where
for each conditional a 6= 9 the upper bound condition b < E  c+ must be
respected. Given that the game is played with discrete values  will be equal
to 1 and thus, given the other parameters, e c+, where  is an arbitrarily
small value, will be equal to 10. Given the strategies above described, the
couple of equilibrium outcomes is vI(s
I) = E and vII(s
II) = (E   c)m
After having characterized equilibrium strategies in the two subgames
originating from the detection decision, it emerges that both the identied
equilibrium outcomes follow from subgame perfect strategies also when the
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whole game is considered. Player I will thus be indierent, in equilibrium,
between choosing the detection and the non detection strategy. The only
discriminating element between the two alternative actions is the fact that
the equilibrium outcome following from detection leads to a payo allocation
which is Pareto superior than the one following from non-detection1.
To summarize, when Agents are rational and their preferences are ori-
ented towards self-seekingness the game has two distinct equilibria in pure
strategies and Player I will be indierent, in equilibrium, between a detection
and non-detection policy.
2.2 A simple model of reciprocity and intrinsic motivations
Recent contributions have focused on individual preferences which are not
characterized only by self interest but take into account also the well-being
of others. Aim of these works is to reconcile the standard economic ap-
proach of maximization of a given objective function with some puzzling
ndings of experimental works. On one side, there are models focused
on distributional preferences (among others, Bolton and Ockenfels (2000);
Fehr and Schmidt (1999)). On the other side, there are models that refer
to Psychological Game Theory (Geanakoplos et al., 1989) and are more fo-
cused on the intentions embedded in observed actions (among others, Rabin
(1993); Falk and Fischbacher (2000)). Relying on the assumption that trust
and reciprocity are the main determinants of behavior in a game of the
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kind considered here we will focus on a simple model of reciprocation in an
Investment Game. The basic assumption of the value function presented
below is that reciprocation has an autonomous psychological value2. The
value function of Agents is accordingly enlarged to account also for this
value component which is added to the monetary component of the value
function.
V2 = E   b + ma + b   (b   a)2 (1)
where
E = initial endowment
b = transfer to Player I
a = transfer from Player I
m = multiplier factor in the IG
 = measure of psychological value of reciprocity
 = measure of perceived kindness
The value component e   b + ma represents the utility deriving from
the monetary transfers in the game and is the same as in the rational self-
ish specication. The additional component b   (b   a)2 captures the
psychological value embedded in the game and links the utility from recip-
rocation to the perceived kindness of partner's action. The positive element
b represents the psychological gain of the subject when reciprocating action
2for a recent work dealing with the neurophysiological evidence of "psychological" value
of reciprocation see Sanfey et al. (2003)
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of Player I. The quadratic component (b  a)2 of the psychological value
implies that both when monetary reciprocation is bigger than the perceived
fairness or lower than this measure the subjects register a cost. The big-
ger the dierence, the higher the psychological cost aorded is. A crucial
element of the value function proposed is the parameter  which captures
perceived kindness embedded in the action of Player I. Given the concav-
ity of V2 with respect to the amount returned b, the best reply function
following from the rst order condition @V2
@b = 0 is
b =
 1 +  + 2a
22








0 one can obtain the condition upon which Player I will submit all of her
endowment to Player II. A simplifying assumption which is introduced at
this point is that psychological value from reciprocation equals monetary
cost of reciprocating. Thus, under the assumption that  = 1 the best reply
for Player II becomes b = a. This in turn implies that the condition for
Player I to submit all her endowment to Player II is  > 1. This can be
interpreted in the following way: when the value of wealth transferred to
Player II is perceived by Player II as higher than the monetary value of
this amount the Player I has a "rational" and selsh incentive to invest all
of her endowment even if there are no collateral available. A methodolog-
ical assumption adopted in the specication of value functions is that the
value function of Player I is a function exclusively of monetary payos. This
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assumption does not alter the nature of behavior described below and one
can easily think of the possibility of introducing a psychological component
which is increasing in the sum recturned by Player II. An additional value
component of this kind simply increases the "utility" Player I obtains from
an interaction based on trust and reciprocity but does not alter the game
strategy.
When beliefs on  are correct, and in equilibrium we assume they are,
one can provide the following characterization of the behavior of Player I as
conditional upon .
a = E if  > 1
a = 0 if  < 1
a 2 [0;E] if  = 1
The above presentation of equilibrium behavior when Agents are charac-
terized by value function 1 was based on an  conceived as an exogenously
given factor. However, in order to experimentally test the impact of bound-
ing strategies imposed by the Principal on the Agent,  will be endogenously
determined by the action undertaken by the Principal in correspondence to
the rst decisional node. Specically, (D) will be lower than one when the
Principal decides to purchase the detection strategy and bigger than one
when the Principal adopts a non-detection strategy:
 < 1 if D = 1
 > 1 if D = 0
The way  is modeled captures the intrinsic motivations component of
the game. Relying on previous contributions it has been shown in section
13DRAFT  --  DRAFT  --  DRAFT  --  DRAFT  --  DRAFT  --  DRAFT  --  DRAFT  --  DRAFT  --  DRAFT  --  DRAFT  --  DRAFT  --  DRAFT  --  DRAFT  --  DRAFT  --  DRAFT  --  DRAFT  --  
1 that in environments where autonomy in decision making is preserved,
actions are more likely to be characterized by intrinsic motivations than in
environments where actions are bounded by the Principal. It has also been
shown that Agents characterized by intrinsic motivations are more likely
to foster cooperative behavior. These two observation give support to the
functional form adopted for . An  > 1 means that the mount of money
submitted by the Principal has an higher value to the Agent than its mere
monetary value because it comprises also a kindness element related to the
decision to warrant autonomy to the Agent. An  < 1 means that Agents
attach a negative component to the monetary transfer from Player I deriving
from the control practices implemented.
Given equation 1 and the functional from of , the Principal's equilib-
rium actions in the game will be to refuse to buy the detection technology
(D = 0) and to invest her entire wealth in the Investment Game (a = E).
On the Agent's side, the action undertaken in equilibrium will be to return
an amount equal to E. Thus, equilibrium outcomes are, for Player I and
Player II respectively, V1 = E and V2 = E +ma. It is interesting to no-
tice that this outcome is Pareto preferable with respect to the two equilibria
obtained under the selsh rational assumption.
The aalue functions specied above allow to explore two alternative re-
search hypotheses within our simple experimental game. The rst hypoth-
esis, which can be termed rational selshness, is that Principals will either
choose to detect the action of the Agents who will reply with minimum eort
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or that Principals will not detect Agent's intentions but submit an amount
equal to zero in the Investment Game. The second hypothesis, which can
be termed intrinsically motivated rational reciprocity, is that Principals will
reject the opportunity to detect intentions of the Agent and "invest" their
entire endowment in the Investment Game. Moreover, Agents are expected
to return an amount of wealth proportional to  which however is higher
than the amount received from Player I. The game allows to clearly identify
whether these hypotheses are supported by the behavior in the game and
thus to draw some conclusions about nature of observed behavior.
To conclude this section it is worthwhile to point out an implicit assump-
tion of the value specication 1 described above is that the game considered
frames attention of the Players on reciprocity issues while distributional con-
siderations are neglected. This assumption is related to the dynamic nature
of the game that naturally tends to focus more on transactions than on nal
distribution3. Future research may try to expand the model to encompass
also distributional concerns.
2.3 Experimental Procedures
The computer-based experiment was run at the Computational and Exper-
imental Economics Laboratory (CEEL) of the University of Trento4 on a
3for an insight into the interplay between distributional and reciprocal concerns in the
Investment Game one can refer to Cox (2004)
4nancial support was provided by CEEL which is acknowledged for this but also for
the technical support provided before, during and after the experiment. Special thanks
are due to Professor Luigi Mittone, Ivan Soraperra and Marco Tecilla but also to the
sta of the laboratory which provided a valuable contribution to this paper. The value of
the support of Dominique Cappelletti is incommensurable and not limited to the present
paper. The nancial and technical support of CEEL is gratefully acknowledge
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client-server infrastructure purposely built using the programming language
Borland c 
 Delphi c 
. Participants were undergraduate students of the Uni-
versity of Trento. The majority of them were students of Economics. Two
identical sessions were run on December 16th, 2004, with 20 participants per
session, for a total of 2x20=40 Subjects. Instructions were read aloud be-
fore the game started and participants were free to ask for clarications after
having read the instructions. Each participants was endowed, independently
of the role in the experiment, with 10 units of Experimental Currency Unit
(ECU). The exchange rate between ECU and Euro reported on the instruc-
tions sheet was 0;75 e for each ECU. The payment was made available
in cash immediately after the second, and last, session. Anonymity among
participants was warranted during and after the game and matching be-
tween the subjects was randomly determined. A control questionnaire was
implemented before the start of the game in order to prevent noise in the
outcome due to a misunderstanding of the experimental procedures. The
questionnaire was implemented through an electronic form which had to be
lled with correct answers on dierent aspects of the game. It is important
to remark here that the experiment was run under a condition of zero so-
cialization. Matching was random and anonymous, subjects had no chance
to interact after having entered the lab. The experiment took on average 40
minuts and the average payment was about 10 e. A brief questionnaire on
some aspects of the experiment was handled out to the subjects at the end
of the experiment in order to better understand observed choices.
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3 Data Analysis
The rst pattern in the data that has to be considered is the number of
subjects who decide to buy or not buy the detection technology. 85% of the
participants (17 out of 20) chose the detection policy. This simple descriptive
statistics already rules out the possibility that Player I believes in positive
reciprocity as a response to the decision of do not detect Agent's action.
Moreover, it suggests that among the two rational equilibrium strategies
the Player prefer to choose the one prescribing the purchase of the detection
technology.
For what attains outcomes in the non detection framework it must be
considered that the small number of Agents observed (i.e., 3) strongly limits
the analysis of behavior in the Investment Game.
Table 1: Non detection framework
N mean med sd min max
Trustor (Player I) 3.00 7.00 7.00 3.00 4.00 10.00
Trustee (Player II) 3.00 0.11 0.14 0.10 0.00 0.20
Table 1 illustrates the decision of the trustor and the trustee in the
standard Investment Game. The decision of the Trustee is reported as a
percentage of the amount sent by the Trustor. What emerges from the
table is that the average contribution of the Trustor is 70% of the total
endowment available with the lower contribution equal to 4 and the higher
equal to the total endowment. The magnitude of trust is on average higher
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than what observed in previous works (e.g., Berg et al., 1995) and this
seems to suggest that those who do not choose to detect Agent's action
are "optimistic" about the reciprocatory attitude of their partner. Actual
choices to reciprocate are, contrary to what expected, much lower than
values registered in the literature on Investment Game. Agents do not react
positively to the decision to trust undertaken by the Principal and try to
almost fully exploit the vulnerability the Principal opens for herself.
When considering the average monetary gains of Player I and Player II
reported in Table 2, it emerges that Players II gain considerably more than
Players I thanks to their opportunistic behavior.
Table 2: Payos in the non-detection environment
N mean med sd min max
Trustor (Player I) 3.00 4.00 4.00 2.00 2.00 6.00
Trustee (Player II) 3.00 30.00 30.00 8.00 22.00 38.00
In general what emerges from observations referring to autonomy sup-
portive environments is that the self-imposed absence of bounds on Agent's
actions undertaken by the Principal is not rewarded by the Agents who not
only do not show reciprocity but apparently neglect also any consideration
in terms of fairness. Moving the attention to the autonomy bounding con-
guration, Figure 2 reports the pattern of repayment for Player II for each
possible amount sent by Player I in case of detection. The possible oers of
Player I are reported on the X   axis while on the Y   axis the top of the
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bar measures the average level of the capital after the investment in terms of
percentage on the capital invested (i.e., b=a). Each cell of the bar represents
the individual share of the mean as measured by the top of that bar. It is
important to recall here that in a rational equilibrium perspective choices
dierent from a = 9 do not meet the incentive compatibility requirement.
Graph 2 provides an evidence of the intention to repay the investment for
each amount between 1 and 9 that Player I can decide to submit.
Figure 2: Detection vector




















The dashed line in the graph corresponds to the threshold that sepa-
rates positive investments from negative investments. For investments cor-
19DRAFT  --  DRAFT  --  DRAFT  --  DRAFT  --  DRAFT  --  DRAFT  --  DRAFT  --  DRAFT  --  DRAFT  --  DRAFT  --  DRAFT  --  DRAFT  --  DRAFT  --  DRAFT  --  DRAFT  --  DRAFT  --  
responding to a < 4 the average gain is negative while it becomes positive for
investments greater than 3. Observing the sharing of the average, it emerges
that as the possible amount invested increases the number of cells increases.
This has to be interpreted as due to the fact that a loer amount of Players
II return 0 to Players I. The general tendency evidenced by the data is a
monotonic increase in correspondence to increase in potential investment.
From graph 2 it emerges a steep increase in repayment in correspondence to
potential investment equal to 9. Dierentiated behavior in correspondence
to this measure with respect to other measures of potential investment is
conrmed also by the non parametric two sample Wilcoxon tests reported
in Table 3.
Table 3: Wilcoxon test (p-values)
a 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9 0.008 0.000 0.001 0.007 0.036 0.012 0.059 0.104
Dierences are statistically signicant at the 10% condifence level in all
the cases except than in the comparison between potential investment equal
to 9 and 8 (i.e., last cell of Table 3).
From Figure 2 and the tests performed one can infer that no punish-
ing behavior has been shown by Player II as a response to the decision of
Player I to introduce the detection system. Despite the introduction of the
autonomy bounding strategy the repayment in correspondence to the equi-
librium choice of Player I is considerably higher that the repayment in the
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other conditional choices. From this observation it is possible to conclude
that no retaliation is implemented by Player II after the introduction of the
detection. For what attains the behavior of Player I in the detection situ-
ation, this is in general in line with equilibrium strategy which prescribes
to send all the endowment. For what attains out of equilibrium behavior
one observation to submit 0, one observation to submit three and, nally,
two observations to submit 8 have been observed. The meaning of out of
equilibrium choices of Player II is dicult to be interpreted, in particular
for what attains low choices. Mistakes are the best candidates to explain
these deviations.
A perspective on the dynamic of the game could be gathered also focusing
on the nal payos of the two Players which are reported in Table 4
Table 4: Payos in the detection environment
N mean med sd min max
Player I 17.00 14.35 14.00 2.76 9.00 18.00
Player II 17.00 20.65 22.00 3.72 10.00 25.00
As it emerges from Table 4, Player II, on average ends the game with a
considerably higher endowment than Player I. This is in line with the equi-
librium outcome but the registered values are dierent than those expected
in equilibrium. In particular, Player I gains more in the actual game than
in the forecasted equilibrium allocation. As the two Players share a given
eciency gain the opposite is necessarily true for Player II.
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It is of some interest to consider the structure in the data of the strategy
vector of Player II when the detection technology is at work. As remarked
above, the equilibrium choice is to send one unit more than the amount sent
by Player I in correspondence to the highest possible amount that Player I
can send. Given this, all the other values of the vector are "meaningless".
Dierent from what expected, however, a well dened pattern in the data
referring to out of equilibrium strategy is observed. The structure in the
data suggests that values are not chosen randomly and data collected will
be considered as a survey on reciprocity propension in a detection condition.
Figure 3: Player II: out of equilibrium choices in the intention vector
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Figure 3 depicts the retributed capital for each out-of-equilibrium po-
tential investment (b=a s a). A small noise is added to values to render
the representation on the plot more eective. The continuous line repre-
sents a linear regression tted with ordinary least squares. The inclination
of the line is positive and equal to 0:06 and is statistically signicant at
the conventional 5% level but the variation explained by the model is very
low (R2 = 0:03). What emerges from the regression is that the higher the
amount sent the more Subjects tend to "hypothetically" reward wealth re-
ceived. This pattern does not emerge among the few observations collected
in the "real" Investment Game and this suggests that retribution is mean-
ingful in trust decision and non-rewarded decision of reciprocation may be
upward biased.
4 Conclusions
The hypotheses about reciprocity and autonomous-supportive behavior are
strongly rejected because the observed behavior of the Players is very far
from the predicted behavior under this assumption. Only 3 subjects out of
20 chose not to detect the activity of Agents and sent a relevant amount of
their wealth to the partner but only one of them sendt all the endowment.
For what attains the rational selsh hypothesis it must rstly be noticed
that nal allocations of payos observed are, on average, not far from what
prescribed by the hypothesis. An interesting deviation from the equilib-
rium strategy has been registered in the behavior of Player II. Rational self-
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regarding preferences will prescribe a minimal repayment in correspondence
of the maximum amount sent by Player I. Instead, that has been observed,
with statistical signicance, is that the repayment choices do not dier con-
siderably in the conditional decisions dierent from cj9 and, at the same
time, decision in cj9 are statistically dierent from the large part of other
conditional decisions. The dierence derives from a mark-up on the repay-
ment which cannot be explained in the standard perspective of rational self
regarding Agents. Looking at the intention vector it emerges that even if the
decision out of equilibrium are "meaningless" subjects tend to follow a linear
reciprocity repayment with a repayment ratio slightly above 1 on average.
In order to better understand the intentions behind the registered mark-up
it could be useful, even if conditions are very dierent, to refer to the evi-
dence emerging from the Ultimatum Game (G uth et al., 1982). No evidence
of costly-punishment has been registered in the decisions of Player II when
the detection condition was overimposed to her choices. Considering the
evidence of altruistic punishment in previous contributions based on games
involving social norms (e.g., Fehr and Gachter, 2002; Fehr and Fischbacher,
2004) this suggests that in our setting the introduction of a monitoring tech-
nology has not been perceived as a constraint or as a threat to cooperation
by the monitored Agents. At a deeper level of analysis the absence of costly
punishment might be attributed to two distinct factors. The subjects may
not be endowed with reciprocity concerns or, alternatively, the introduction
of a detection strategy has no impact on reciprocity concerns. Further re-
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search is needed to disentangle these two dierent sources of non reciprocity
in the game.
For what attains the few observations associated with the non detection
setting, it must be observed that they do not conform to any of the research
hypothesis reported above. Trustors invest an amount which is on average
higher than what usually observed in Investment Games. Player II's behav-
ior is almost fully opportunistic and leads to big losses for Players of type 1.
This suggests that the behavior of Player II is at all in
uenced by the trust
signaling monitoring decision of Player I. All the investments undertaken
by Players 1 who do not buy the detection strategy register considerable
losses. For what attains the nal allocation of payos a big gap between
Player I and Player II emerges in the detection environment while the situa-
tion is more balanced in the non-detection setting, however also in the latter
Player II are made relatively better o in comparison with Players of type 1.
The fact that all the Principals acting according to an equilibrium strategy
choose the detection technology might signal that they are concerned with
collective welfare and are not characterized by preferences for equity in the
payo distribution. It must however be noticed that when Player's type
is not common knowledge it is safer for Player II to choose the equilibrium
which prescribes of not buying the detection technology and send an amount
equal to zero in the Investment Game.
An alternative hypothesis that deserves more attention in future research
is that Principals are attracted by the monitoring technology and focus more
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on the potential power of control and do not asess correctly the consequences
of their actions.
The outcomes of the experiment sharply dier from previous eld studies,
mainly based on self-reported values, which have been brie
y considered
in the introduction. The dierence in identication with an organizational
structure between experiments and real life situations represents a candidate
explanation for dierent pattern observed (Simon, 1991). A direction for
future research will be to consider the impact of "socialization" on the game
introducing a 2x2 design, where the two factors will be ex-ante non-strategic
interaction (cheap talk, common task ...) and repetition of the game.
To brie
y summarize, results of the experiment it must be evidenced
how Principals opting for the detection strategy conclude the game with
a positive gain while Principals opting for a more autonomous-supportive
framework end the game with losses on their initial endowment. Moreover,
not only Principals do not seem to believe in the potential reciprocator atti-
tude of the Agents but the few who do are "betrayed" by Agents revealing to
be self-seeking oriented and who not show any kind of reciprocity. Moreover,
Agents acting under a detection regime provide a return on the investment
of the Principal that is higher than that prescribed by rational equilibrium
strategy. All the evidence collected is in favor of control practices in inter-
actions similar to those captured by the game. Principals do not pursue
autonomy in decision making or the Agents and in th efew cases when this
happens no positive impact on Agents' reciprocity is registered.
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